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Abstract 
Using a sample of 686 investable firms from 26 emerging market countries, I show that equity market 
liberalizations do not result in an increase in externally-financed growth rates for participating firms. In 
fact, I find to the contrary. The average firm appears to rely less and not more on external-financing once 
they become investable. These findings are in line with recent work which shows that firms issue less 
equity capital post-liberalization, and suggest that the gains from equity market liberalizations may not be 
attributable to a reduction in financing constraints.      
 
JEL Classification: G15 ; G32.    
Key Words: External financing; Investability; Firm growth.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[2] 
 
1. Introduction 
The decision on the part of countries to liberalize their domestic equity markets has attracted 
considerable academic attention. Although not without its detractors (see Rodrik, 1998), this line of 
enquiry has shown equity market liberalizations in a good light. For example, studies performed at the 
level of the firm suggest that equity market liberalizations benefit firms because they, amongst others, 
serve to increase investment and improve operating performance (see Bae and Goyal, 2010; and Mitton, 
2006), enhance firm visibility and improve corporate governance (see Bae et al., 2006), and ultimately 
enhance firm value (see Bae and Goyal, 2010; and Mitton and O’Connor, 2012). At the aggregate level, 
equity market liberalizations result in enhanced investment, and economic growth (See Bekeart et al. 
2005, 2007, 2010; Quinn and Toyoda, 2008).  
  However, with the exception of some recent work, the central theoretical prediction which 
underpins equity market liberalizations has been largely ignored. Equity market liberalizations, by 
definition, refer to instances in which restrictions on the foreign ownership of domestic equity are lifted. 
As a result, post-liberalization we should then expect to observe greater equity issuance, potential changes 
in debt issuance and shifts in debt maturity structure, and ultimately a relaxation in financing constraints.1 
While the extant literature provides indirect evidence to suggest that this may in fact be the case (e.g. the 
“investable premium” of Mitton and O’Connor (2012) and the improvement in operating performance 
witnessed by investable firms as documented by Mitton (2006) are both consistent with a relaxation in 
financing constraints), more recent direct tests suggest that this may not be so. Flavin and O’Connor 
(2010) and McLean et al. (2011) examine the post-liberalization capital issuance activity of investable 
firms. Surprisingly, neither Flavin and O’Connor (2010) nor McLean et al. (2011) document a significant 
change in equity issuance once firms become investable. Flavin and O’Connor (2010) uncover no 
significant change in post-liberalization net equity issuance for investable firms. Also for investable firms, 
McLean et al. (2011) actually document a significant decrease. Taken together, these findings suggest that, if 
                                                 
1 While there is no direct theoretical link between equity market liberalizations and corporate debt issuance, equity 
market liberalization may promote greater debt issuance e.g. greater use of long-term debt, if investors are now more 
willing to invest in firms that now have foreign investors. Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006) document a shift 
towards short-term debt for firms after stock market liberalizations. Flavin and O’Connor (2010) find to the 
contrary using a firm-specific (and presumably less noisy) measure of equity market liberalizations i.e. the investable 
measure.         
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anything, equity market liberalizations result in a decrease, and not an increase in the use of external equity 
financing, and a potential increase in financing constraints.    
 In this paper, I examine this issue further. I do so by examining the contribution made by 
external (debt and equity) finance in explaining the post-investable improvements in operating 
performance documented by, amongst others, Mitton (2006). To do so, I begin with the 
constrained/predicted growth rates of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). These measures predict 
the maximum growth rates that a firm can achieve given access to internal funds and short-term external 
debt financing only (denoted as SFGt), or internal funds, short and long-term debt financing (denoted as 
SGt), respectively. Then, using these predicted growth rates, I calculate the difference between a firms’ actual 
and predicted growth rate, since the difference is a measure of access to external financing, and more 
precisely a firms’ externally-financed growth rate (EFG). Equity market liberalizations should result in an 
increase in externally-financed growth rates for investable firms. In this paper, I test this proposition.  
 To do so, I form a panel of 686 investable firms, and 2,104 firms in total from 26 emerging 
market countries. Using a series of firm-fixed effects regressions which span the period from 1980 to 
2000, and control for numerous determinants of externally-financed growth, I document a decrease in 
externally-financed growth rates for investable firms. For some categories of firms, I document no 
significant change, but never an increase in externally-financed growth rates. My findings, together with 
those of Flavin and O’Connor (2010) and McLean et al. (2011), suggest that the relative contribution made 
by external financing (i.e. long-term debt and equity financing) vis-à-vis internal financing to firm growth, 
as documented by Mitton (2006), is less because firms use less external financing once they become 
investable.  
 Collectively, these findings serve to better inform our understanding of the effects of equity 
market liberalizations. First, they do not suggest that firms do not benefit from becoming investable. 
Ample evidence exists to suggest otherwise (see Mitton, 2006; Bae et al., 2006; Bae and Goyal, 2010; and 
Mitton and O’Connor, 2012). What they do suggest is that the source(s) of the gains documented in the 
literature do not result from greater risk sharing and a reduction in financing constraints. The gains are 
likely to result from improvements in a firms information environment resulting from corporate 
governance improvements (see Bae et al. 2006). This contrasts notable with the experience of firms cross-
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listing in the U.S. because the “cross-listing premium” is a function of improved governance (see Doidge 
et al. 2004, 2009; Lang et al. 2003), reduced financing constraints (see Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Lins et 
al 2005; Khurana et al. 2009), and greater recognition (see King and Segal, 2009). However, these findings 
also leave some questions unanswered. McLean et al. (2011) suggest that investable firms use less external 
finance once they become investable because they are mature firms with little need for external financing. 
On the other hand, as pointed out by Laeven et al. (2003), financial liberalization disproportionately 
benefits small firms more. Large firms, largely financially unconstrained pre-liberalization, witness 
deterioration in their ability to source external capital as liberalization proceeds. Since, by definition, 
investable firms are large firms, the former explanation likely explains my findings.            
 The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I outline the measures of externally-financed 
growth. Section 3 describes the sample of firms used in this study. Section 4 presents and discusses the 
empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.      
 
2. Measures of Externally Financed Growth 
 To construct measures of externally-financed firm growth rates, we adopt Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic’s (1998) application of a firm-based financial planning model. This approach has been 
subsequently adopted by, amongst others, Khurana et al. (2008). The following draws heavily on Khurana 
et al. (2008). The construction of a firm’s externally-financed growth rate (EFG) at time t involves two 
steps. The first step involves the construction of what are termed “constrained or predicted growth 
rates”. They represent the maximum growth that a firm can achieve if the firm relies solely on say, 
internal funds, internal funds and short-term debt, and internal funds and short and long-term debt 
financing. The second involves using these “constrained or predicted growth rates” to calculate a firm’s 
externally-financed growth rate. Externally-financed growth represents the difference between a firm’s 
realized growth rate (normally measured on an annual basis using either sales or asset growth) and the 
firm’s “constrained or predicted growth rate”. A priori, if equity market liberalizations result in greater 
externally-financed growth rates for firms, then we would expect to observe an increase in the difference 
between a firm's realized growth rates and their “constrained or predicted growth rate”. I begin by 
outlining the “constrained or predicted growth rates” of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998).    
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 Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), building on the “percentage of sales” approach to 
financial planning construct three “constrained or predicted growth rates”, which they denote as IGt, 
SFGt, and SGt. IGt is the maximum growth that a firm can achieve if it relies solely on internal funds. 
SFGt is the maximum growth rate that a firm can attain through the use of both internal cash-flows and 
short-term debt, and finally, SGt is the maximum growth rate achievable using internal funds, short and 
long-term debt external financing. I concentrate on the latter two.2 The starting point for each begins 
with the expression for the external financing need (EFN) of a firm, which is given by: 
t t t t t tEFN g * Assets 1 g * E * b                                                                                          (1) 
Simply put, the external financing need for a firm at time t is given by the difference between the product 
of assets at time t (Assetst) times’ sales growth at time t (gt) and the product of earnings after interest and 
taxes (Et), the proportion of earnings retained for reinvestment at time t (bt), and 1 plus sales growth at 
time t. Firms have an external financing need if t t t t tg * Assets 1 g * E * b i.e. the required 
investment of a firm growth at rate gt t tg * Assets is not adequately covered by internal funds
t t t1 g * E * b . Using this expression for a firm’s external financing need, we can then proceed to 
derive two measures of constrained firm growth. The first, which is denoted as SFGt, is the maximum 
growth rate that a firm can attain through the use of both internal cash-flows and short-term debt. If we 
further assume a constant short-term debt to assets ratio to ensure a feasible growth estimate for the firm, 
then SFGt is obtained by setting the retention ratio (bt) in the expression for firm’s external financing 
need to (1) i.e. the firm pays no dividend and solving for gt. The implied growth rate, denoted as SFGt is 
then given by: 
t
t
t
ROLTC
SFG
1 ROLTC
                                                                                                                     (2) 
ROLTCt is the ratio of earnings after interest and taxation (EAITt) to long-term capital.3 Long-term 
capital is defined as the assets of the firm not financed using short-term debt, and is calculated by 
                                                 
2 Emerging market firms typically use short-term debt, for a variety of reasons, as their major source of external 
financing (see Opazo et al. 2009).  
3 I’m forced to use earnings before interest and taxation in place of earnings after interest and taxation expense 
because Worldscope coverage of interest and taxation expense for emerging market firms is limited.   
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multiplying a firm’s total assets by 1 minus the ratio of short-term liabilities to total assets. SFGt is 
referred to as the maximum short-term financed growth rate.  
 The second constrained growth rate denoted as SGt is the maximum growth rate achievable 
using internal funds, short and long-term debt to maintain a constant book leverage ratio (i.e. total debt to 
assets). Further assume the following. First, the payout ratio remains at zero, second, that the firm does 
not issue equity or increase leverage beyond the realized level, and third, the retention ratio (bt) is set to 
(1). The estimate of SGt is then estimated by first; replacing total assets in the expression or external 
financing need with book equity, and second, setting Eq. (1) to zero. Solving for gt, the result, now 
denoted as SGt is given by: 
t
t
t
ROE
SG
1 ROE
                                                                                                                             (3) 
ROEt is the return on equity. SGt is referred to as the maximum sustainable growth rate.    
With the constrained or predicted growth rates defined, the second and final step involves 
calculating a firm’s externally-financed growth rate. Externally-financed growth rates (EFG) for a firm in 
each year are given by difference in the annual realized sales (or asset) growth rate less the constrained or 
predicted growth rates just outlined. These measures of external-financed growth examine if each firms 
actual growth (using realized sales or asset growth) is greater than predicted by the maximum short-term 
financed growth rate (SFGt) or the maximum sustainable growth rate (SGt). The greater the difference 
between the actual and predicted growth rate, the greater is that part of growth externally-financed. 
Following the notation in Khurana et al. (2008), I denote these two externally-financed growth rates as 
EXCESS SFG and EXCESS SG. Both of these measures serve as dependent variables in our empirical 
setup.  
The benchmark empirical setup involves regressing each of these two measures of externally-
financed growth on the investable dummy (a firm specific measure of equity market liberalizations), a set 
of firm-level control variables, and time and firm fixed effects. I follow Khurana et al. (2008) and include 
the following firm-level control variables. These are dividends (DIV/TA), firm performance using 
profitability (EBIT/TA) and asset turnover (NS/NFA), firm size (SIZE), growth opportunities 
(NFA/TA), and a measure of a firm’s reliance on long-term debt (LTD/TA). The reason underlying the 
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inclusion is as follows. Firms that pay sizable dividends (DIV/TA), that are profitable (EBIT/TA) and 
with considerable asset turnover (NS/NFA) are expected to have sizable internal funds, and as a result, 
less of a reliance on external funds. The obvious implication is that these firms will have low externally-
financed growth rates. In contrast, small firms (SIZE), firms with a greater reliance on long-term debt 
(LTD/TA), and firms with sizable growth opportunities (NFA/TA) tend to rely more on external funds.4 
These firms are expected to have higher externally-financed growth rates. DIV/TA is total dividends to 
total assets, profitability is measured as earnings before interest and taxation to total assets (EBIT/TA), 
and asset turnover is measured as the ratio of net sales to net fixed assets (NS/NFA). I measure firm size 
(SIZE) as the natural log of total assets, expressed in real U.S. dollars. Reliance on long-term debt is 
measured as the ratio of long-term debt divided by lag total assets (LTD/TA). Finally, growth 
opportunities are measured as the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). All firm-level 
financial information is sourced from Worldscope for each year from 1980 to 2000.  Finally, I exclude all 
financial firms.    
 To examine the relationship between equity market liberalization and externally-financed growth 
rates, I estimate the following: 
it it it
it 1 it 2 3 4
it it it
it it
5 it 6 7 t i it
it 1 it
it it it
it 1 it 2 3 4
it it it
it
5 it 6 7
it 1
DIV EBIT NS
EXCESS SG INVESTABLE
TA TA NFA
LTD NFA
SIZE
TA TA
DIV EBIT NS
EXCESS SFG INVESTABLE
TA TA NFA
LTD NF
SIZE
TA
it
t i it
it
A
TA
 
(4a) 
(4b) 
Where in addition to the variables described earlier, αt and αi are time and firm-fixed effects.5 Finally, 
INVESTABLEit is a firm-specific measure of equity market liberalizations (as opposed to an all-
encompassing country-wide measure). More specifically, it is a 0/1 dummy which is 1 if the firm in 
deemed investable, and 0 otherwise. If equity market liberalization impacts positively on externally-
                                                 
4 As pointed out by Khurana et al. (2008), growth opportunities decrease in the ratio of net fixed assets to total 
assets (NFA/TA). Hence, I would expect to find a negative relationship between externally-financed growth and 
NFA/TA.   
5 I find that my conclusions remain unaltered if I cluster by country or by country and time as McLean et al. (2011) 
do (see Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011)). The standard errors clustered by country and country and time tend 
to be larger than the standard errors clustered by firm alone.      
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financed growth, then, a priori, I would expect β1 to be positive. In the next section, I describe the sample 
of firms used in this study.   
 
3. Sample Description 
 I begin by sourcing an initial sample of all 2,784 firms from the major markets of the IFC 
Emerging Market Database that were deemed investable at any time between 1980 and 2000. Like Mitton 
(2006), I measure the openness of a firm’s stock to foreign investors using the “investable” measure 
provided by the EMDB.6 The IFC designates a firm as investable if its stock is free from both country-
level and firm-level restrictions on foreign investment. It also requires that the stocks have sufficient size 
and liquidity to be realistically available to foreign investors. I define a firm as investable in a given year if 
the firm’s stock appears in the IFC investable index by December of that year.  
 To be included in the final sample, firms must have financial data available in the Worldscope 
database and satisfy a number of minimum-data requirements, also consistent with Mitton (2006). First, 
firms that become investable in the sample period are required to have financial data available at least one 
year before and one year after the year in which they are first deemed investable. Second, firms that never 
become investable are required to have financial data available one year either side of the median year in 
which firms are first investable in their respective countries. From the initial sample, I lose all firms from 
Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Slovakia, and Zimbabwe due to insufficient financial data.   
 The final sample, outlined in Table 1 consists of 686 investable firms from twenty six countries. 
They are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. The total number of non-investable firms is 1,418, 
which added to the number investable firm’s results in a final sample of 2,104 firms, or 13,821 firm-year 
observations. In Table 1, I outline by country, the number of investable (# Inv) and non-investable (# 
NI) firms, the number of firm-year observations (# Obs), and the total number of firms (# Total). The 
number of sample firms per country varies significantly, ranging from a minimum of 7 in Russia to a high 
of 298 in Malaysia. Malaysia provides the greatest number of firm-year observations with 2,242, or 
                                                 
6 Amongst others, Mitton and O’Connor (2012), Flavin and O’Connor (2010), and McLean et al. (2011) all use the 
investable firm-specific measure of equity market liberalizations. 
 
[9] 
 
16.22% of the total firm-year observations. Korea (89) provides the largest number of investable firms, 
while Hungary provides a single investable firm. The final sample covers the period from 1980 to 2000. 
The median investable firm in my sample first becomes investable in 1990 (see column labeled “First 
Invest” in Table 1). Firms from, amongst others, Korea (1981) and Portugal (1986) become investable 
much earlier. Firms from the Czech Republic (1997) and Russia (1997) become investable much later. 
   
4. Findings 
 Table 2 contains the coefficient estimates arising from estimating Eq’s. (4a and 4b) with and 
without time fixed effects.7 I also present estimates of Eq’s. (4a and 4b), where the dependent variable is 
calculated using asset growth (and not sales growth as before). Columns 1-4 contain the coefficient 
estimates when EXCESS SG is the dependent variable. The remaining columns (5-8) use EXCESS SFG 
as measure of external financing growth (EFG). If equity market liberalizations permit greater access to 
external financing for investable firms which in turn serve to relax financing constraints, and ultimately 
result in greater externally-financed growth, then, a priori, I would expect the coefficient estimates on the 
investable dummy to be statistically positive.8 Surprisingly, this is not what I find. In fact, I find to the 
contrary. The coefficient estimates suggest that irrespective of the dependent variable employed 
(EXCESS SG or EXCESS SFG), the measurement of external financing growth (Using sales or asset 
growth), or given the inclusion or exclusion of time fixed effects, and without exception, the coefficient 
estimates on the investable dummy are negative, and always statistically different to zero. 9 The coefficient 
estimates range from -0.047 to -0.122 and suggest that, if anything, and contrary to expectations, equity 
market liberalizations result in a decrease in externally-financed growth rates for investable firms. These 
findings suggest that the growth effects associated with stock market liberalizations, documented by 
amongst others, Mitton (2006), are not the result of a relaxation in financing constraints. Recent work by 
Flavin and O’Connor (2010) and McLean et al. (2011) corroborate my findings. Both find that investable 
                                                 
7 Khuranna et al. (2008) estimate equations (4a and 4b) with firm fixed effects but without time fixed effects. When 
I exclude time fixed effects, and as expected, the coefficient estimates tend to be much larger, and the standard 
errors much smaller.     
8 The analysis presented in Gupta and Yuan (2009) suggest that equity market liberalizations do reduce financing 
constraints.  
9 I also estimate a series of pooled ordinary least squares estimates with country, time, and industry fixed effects 
included (as Khurana et al. (2008) also do). When I do so, I find that my conclusions are qualitatively unchanged. 
The estimates are available from me upon request.   
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firms do not issue more equity financing once firms become investable. In fact, McLean et al. (2011) 
document a significant decrease in equity issues (and an increase in debt issuance) once firms become 
investable.10 In summary, my findings, when added to theirs, suggests that investable firms use less equity 
financing once they become investable, resulting in a decrease in externally-financed growth rates.11     
 The coefficient estimates on the firm-level control variables suggest that externally-financed 
growth rates are smaller for dividend paying, profitable firms, and firms with a reliance on long-term debt 
financing. In contrast, and contrary to expectations, larger firms have higher externally financed growth 
rates. Khurana et al. (2008) find the same. The coefficient estimates on the remaining two control 
variables (NFA/TA) and (NS/NFA) tend to switch sign depending on the where external financing 
growth is measured using sales or asset growth.12   
 Table 2 suggests that firm growth is financed more using internal funds, at least relative to 
external finds once firms become investable. In Tables 3 and 4, I estimate Eq’s. (4a and 4b), but now by 
level of financial development, corporate governance, and financing constraints. I do so since the analysis 
performed in Table 2 is likely to mask the differential effect that investability is likely to have across firms. 
Studies closely related to this one suggest that this is the case. Mitton and O’Connor (2012) show that the 
“investable premium” is much larger for firms with sizable pre-investable financing constraints. Both Bae 
and Goyal (2010) and O’Connor (2012) attribute the greatest value gains from equity market 
liberalizations to better-governed firms. In Table 3, I estimate Eq’s. (4a and 4b) for firms from countries 
with above and below-median financial development. Using financial development indicators from the 
World Bank, I measure financial development using either domestic credit to the private sector (as a % of 
GDP) (DCPS) or market capitalization of listed firms, also as a % of GDP (MCAP).13 In Table 4, I 
estimate Eq’s. (4a and 4b), now by strength of corporate governance, and by level of financing 
constraints. To measure the strength of corporate governance, I use an indicator variable that takes the 
                                                 
10 Chari and Henry (2008) also find no significant change in external financing using a country-level indicator of 
equity market liberalizations.  
11 The evidence is mixed in relation to the relationship between equity market liberalizations and debt issuance. 
McLean et al. (2011) document a significant increase in net debt issuance; Flavin and O’Connor (2010) document a 
decrease. Agca et al. (2007) also document a decrease using leverage ratios (debt to assets). My findings suggest that 
irrespective of the relationship, there is no increase in externally-financed growth rates (using either long-term debt 
or equity).    
12 Khurana et al. (2008) also document sign changes for some of their control variables, depending on the regression 
specification employed.  
13 Table 1 outlines the financial development indicators by country. They suggest that financial markets are well-
developed in Malaysia, but not so in Venezuela.   
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value of one if the firm is a dual-class share firm (DC), and zero for a single-class share firm (SC). 14 To 
classify firms as either SC or DC, I employ the ‘Currently a Multiple Share Company’ from Worldscope. 
It identifies multiple share companies as “…companies which currently have more than one type of 
common/ordinary share.” Of the total number of investable firms (see Table 1), 476 are single-class share 
firms, and the remaining 210 are dual-class share firms. All 89 Korean investable firms are single-class 
share firms. Brazil (35) provides the greatest number of dual-class investable firms. I proxy for the level of 
financing constraints using corporate dividend payouts (see Fazzari et al. (1988)). Dividend payouts are 
measured using dividends to assets.15 I classify financially constrained investable firms as those with 
below-median pre-investable dividend payouts. The bottom panel of Table 4 presents the coefficient 
estimates for firms with above- and below median dividend payouts.      
 The coefficient estimates presented in Table 3 suggest that the earlier findings presented in Table 
2 are the sole preserve of investable firms from countries with well-developed financial markets. The 
coefficients estimates on the investable dummy for these firms largely mirror those for the entire sample 
of firms; they are negative and always statistically significant. In contrast, and almost without exception, 
for firms from countries with low quality financial markets, and for whom presumably investability is 
likely to have the largest impact, the coefficient estimates are much smaller, and statistically indifferent to 
zero. While these coefficient estimates do highlight how equity market liberalizations are likely to impact 
firms differently, nevertheless, the findings here do not point to a greater reliance on external financing 
once firms become investable. For firms where financial markets are not well-developed, external 
financing does not appear to play a greater role once firms become investable. Furthermore, I find that 
these conclusions remain unaltered irrespective of the measure of financial development that I employ.  
 Table 4 contains the estimates by strength of corporate governance and level of financing 
constraints. The top panel contains the estimates by strength of corporate governance; the bottom by 
(pre-investable) level of financing constraints. The tests by level of corporate governance will further shed 
                                                 
14 Durnev and Kim (2005, 2007) show using CLSA and S&P corporate governance data that in firms where control 
rights exceed cashflow rights (e.g. dual-class share firms), corporate governance standards tend to be lower in these 
firms, relative to firms where no such differences (or much smaller differences) exist between control and cashflow 
rights (e.g. single-class share firms). Consistent with the view, the consumption of private benefits tends to be 
greater in firms with dual-class shares compared to firms with single-class share structures (DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1988, and more recently, Masulis et al., 2009).   
15 I use dividends to assets and not dividends to earnings or dividends to cashflow because the sample sizes using 
either earnings or cashflow are smaller.   
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light on the underlying sources of the “investable premia” documented by Mitton and O’Connor (2012) 
and O’Connor (2012).16 The former uncover an “investable premium” in the region of 9% for investable 
firms, and the latter finds that only single-class share investable firms enjoy such a premium. Hence, if 
reduced financing constraints explain at least part of the “investable premium” for single-class share 
firms, then I would expect β1 to be positive and statistically significant for these firms. If β1 is not 
positive, this then would that the underlying sources of the “investable premium” lay elsewhere, probably 
a result of improvements in a firm’s corporate governance practices (see Bae et al. 2006).   
 The coefficient estimates suggests that neither dual nor single class share firms experience an 
increase in externally-financed growth once they become investable. For both, and almost without 
exception, the coefficient estimates on the investable dummy are negative and statistically significant. 
These findings suggest that the “investable premium” is likely the result of, amongst other factors, an 
improvement in corporate governance, in part presumably arising from greater participation from foreign 
institutional investors.17 Since institutional investors appear reluctant to invest in poorly-governed firms 
(see Leuz et al. (2009)), poorly governed firms do not enjoy an “investable premium” because they 
experience neither an improvement in corporate governance nor a decrease in financing constraints (see 
O’Connor, 2012).     
 Finally, I tend to reach similar conclusions when I classify firms by level of financing constraints. 
For both sets of firms, the coefficient estimates on the investable dummy are statistically negative. In fact, 
if anything, the bottom panel suggests that financially-constrained firms (firms with below-median 
dividend payout), and those firms with potentially the most to gain from becoming investable rely even 
less on external financing once they become investable. For these firms, the promise of reduced financing 
constraints from becoming investable fails to materialize.18 
 
                                                 
16 The “cross-listing premium”, similar to the “investable premium” is a result of, amongst others, reduced financing 
constraints, and improvements in corporate governance, and greater recognition (see Lins et al. 2005; Reese and 
Weisbach, 2003; Doidge et al 2009; and King and Segal, 2009). 
17 Consistent with this view, Bae et al. (2006) document an improvement in a firm information environment post-
liberalization. Aggarwal et al. (2011) and Ferreira and Matos (2008) highlight the role played by foreign institutional 
investors in improving corporate governance.    
18 Mitton and O’Connor (2012) find no “investable premium” for financially-constrained and unconstrained firms 
when they use dividend payouts to proxy for financing constraints. When they use investment-cashflow sensitivities 
to gauge the extent of financing constraints, they do find a large “investable premium” for financially-constrained 
firms. I don’t have access to data which would allow me to estimate investment-cashflow sensitivities. Thus, I am 
unable to perform a similar exercise to them.   
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5. Concluding Remarks 
 In this paper I document results which are consistent with recent evidence which suggests that 
investable firms use less, and not more, external-financing once they become investable. Flavin and 
O’Connor (2010) and McLean et al. (2011) examine the post-investable external capital issuance behavior 
of investable firms, and find that there is a decrease in the issuance of equity capital, while the evidence 
regarding debt issuance is mixed. In this paper, I examine this issue further, but adopt a different 
approach. Specifically, I examine the contribution made by external-financing to the performance of 
investable firms by examining how their externally-financed growth rates change once they become 
investable.  
 To do so, I calculate the difference between firms’ actual and predicted growth rate using the 
constrained/predicted growth rates of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). The difference between a 
firms actual and predicted growth rate is a measure of the extent of a firm’s external-financing activity.   
If equity market liberalizations result in a relaxation of financing constraints, then this difference should 
increase, once firms become investable. This is not what I find.   
 My findings are in line with both Flavin and O’Connor (2010) and McLean et al. (2011). I find 
that investable firms experience a decline in their externally-financed growth rates once they become 
investable. When I further disaggregate my original sample by level of financial development, financing 
constraints, and corporate governance, I uncover no evidence which suggests that equity market 
liberalizations result in a reduction in financing constraints, and ultimately increases in externally-financed 
growth rates. While I and others can only speculative as to why this occurs, what these findings do 
suggest is that the gains from become investable are not the result of reduced financing constraints, but 
more likely from improvements in corporate governance.     
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TABLE 1 
Sample Description 
The table reports summary statistics of the sample by country. Investable dates are taken from the Emerging Markets Database 
(EMDB). # Obs is the number of firm-year observations; # Inv is the number of investable firms; # NI is the number of non-
investable firms, and # Total is the total number of firms. First Invest is the first year in which the sample of investable firms 
enters the sample. “Invest & SC” and “Invest & DC” refers to the number of single- and dual-class investable firms. Financial 
development indicators are sourced from the World Bank. DCPS is credit provided to the private sector in the country (as a % 
of GDP), and MCAP is market capitalization of listed firms in the country (as a % of GDP).    
 Sample Description Key Date Financial 
Development 
Indicators 
Investable Single and 
Dual-Class Share 
Firms 
 # Invest # NI # Total  # Obs First 
Invest 
DCPS MCAP Invest & 
SC 
Invest & 
DC 
Argentina 17 8 25 180 1988 0.239 0.584 7 10 
Brazil 37 48 85 567 1990 0.347 0.376 2 35 
Chile 25 33 58 431 1992 0.635 0.800 22 3 
China 28 82 110 533 1991 1.246 0.538 1 27 
Colombia 7 8 15 126 1990 0.269 0.115 6 1 
Czech Rp. 4 13 17 62 1997 0.540 0.214 4 0 
Greece 34 59 93 701 1986 - 0.990 20 14 
Hungary 1 8 9 50 1993 0.322 0.258 1 0 
India 49 198 247 1,111 1990 0.288 0.321 49 0 
Indonesia 31 75 106 729 1990 0.219 0.179 5 26 
Israel 10 11 21 129 1993 0.869 0.581 10 0 
Korea 89 139 228 1,598 1981 1.010 0.372 89 0 
Malaysia 82 216 298 2,242 1981 1.406 1.299 82 0 
Mexico 29 29 58 456 1981 0.130 0.216 7 22 
Pakistan 16 55 71 433 1993 0.298 0.108 15 1 
Peru 12 11 23 120 1992 0.259 0.198 2 10 
Philippines 23 36 59 357 1991 0.444 0.689 17 6 
Poland 13 17 30 148 1994 0.278 0.191 13 0 
Portugal 16 19 35 291 1986 1.398 0.573 12 4 
Russia 5 2 7 28 1997 0.119 0.150 5 0 
Sth Africa 28 53 81 905 1981 0.289 0.066 23 5 
Sri Lanka 10 1 11 68 1994 1.389 1.602 10 0 
Taiwan 58 110 168 897 1989 - - 57 1 
Thailand 46 148 194 1331 1988 1.084 0.244 2 44 
Turkey 12 35 47 40 1988 0.237 0.350 12 0 
Venezuela 4 4 8 288 1996 0.120 0.067 3 1 
 TOTALS COUNTRY SAMPLE 
MEDIANS 
TOTALS 
 686 1,418 2,104 13,821 1990 0.310 0.321 476 210 
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TABLE 2 
Regression Estimates 
This table reports coefficient estimates from firm-fixed effects with t-statistics (absolute value) reported in parentheses. The t-
statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered at the firm level. INVESTABLE is a dummy variable that is set equal to 
one in years in which the firm is designated as investable. The dependent variables are Excess SG and Excess SFG. Excess SG 
is a firm’s actual sales or asset growth rate (as indicated) which exceeds its predicted sustainable growth rate (SG). The predicted 
sustainable growth rate (SG) is calculated as (ROE/(1 ROE))where ROE is the return on equity. Excess SFG is a firm’s 
actual sales or asset growth rate (as indicated) which exceeds its predicted short-term financed growth rate (SFG). For each 
firm, SFG is calculated as (ROLTC/(1 ROLTC)) where ROLTC is the ratio of earnings after interest and tax to long-term 
capital. Long-term capital denotes the assets of a firm not financed by short-term debt, and is calculated as the product of a 
firm’s total assets and 1 minus the ratio of short-term liabilities to total assets. DIV/TA is total dividends divided by total assets. 
EBIT/NS is earnings before interest and taxation to net sales. NS/NFA is net sales to net fixed assets. Firm Size [SIZE] is 
proxied using the log of  assets in real US$. LTD/TA is long-term debt to total assets and NFA/TA is net fixed assets to total 
assets. A full set of firm and time fixed-effects are included but not reported. # Obs is the number of firm-year observations. 
The overall R-Squared is reported. Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.       
 Measures of Externally Financed Growth (EFG) 
 Excess SG Excess SFG 
 Sales Growth Asset Growth Sales Growth  Asset Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
INVESTABLE 
 
-0.049*** 
(3.11) 
-0.100*** 
(6.62) 
-0.051*** 
(3.75) 
-0.109*** 
(8.18) 
-0.047*** 
(3.26) 
-0.112*** 
(7.68) 
-0.050*** 
(3.87) 
-0.122*** 
(9.11) 
         
DIV/TA 
 
-2.110*** 
(5.75) 
-1.656*** 
(4.84) 
-2.049*** 
(7.00) 
-1.428*** 
(5.28) 
-1.533*** 
(5.96) 
-0.864*** 
(3.44) 
-1.429*** 
(7.18) 
-0.596*** 
(2.91) 
EBIT/NS 
 
-0.417*** 
(8.70) 
-0.360*** 
(7.84) 
-0.358*** 
(10.68) 
-0.273*** 
(8.39) 
-0.168*** 
(4.06) 
-0.082** 
(2.04) 
-0.104*** 
(3.92) 
0.010 
(0.33) 
NS/NFA 
 
0.021*** 
(4.47) 
0.023*** 
(4.56) 
-0.033*** 
(7.42) 
-0.031*** 
(7.16) 
0.036*** 
(7.94) 
0.039*** 
(7.61) 
-0.019*** 
(4.93) 
-0.016*** 
(3.99) 
SIZE 
 
0.189*** 
(12.84) 
0.144*** 
(11.04) 
0.219*** 
(15.86) 
0.152*** 
(12.46) 
0.224*** 
(16.25) 
0.159*** 
(12.41) 
0.256*** 
(18.94) 
0.170*** 
(13.85) 
LTD/TA 
 
0.010 
(0.09) 
-0.034 
(0.54) 
-0.011 
(0.21) 
-0.042 
(0.78) 
-0.087* 
(1.67) 
-0.149*** 
(2.73) 
-0.114*** 
(2.56) 
-0.168*** 
(3.51) 
NFA/TA 
 
0.192*** 
(2.94) 
0.175*** 
(2.68) 
-0.122** 
(2.16) 
-0.155*** 
(2.71) 
0.122** 
(2.20) 
0.094 
(1.61) 
-0.219*** 
(4.45) 
-0.264*** 
(4.87) 
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
# Obs 13,821 13,821 13,821 13,821 13,821 13,821 13,821 13,821 
R-Squared 0.033 0.027 0.048 0.049 0.025 0.010 0.034 0.017 
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TABLE 3 
Regression Estimates 
This table reports coefficient estimates from firm-fixed effects with t-statistics (absolute value) reported in parentheses. Seperate 
regressions are reported for firms in countries with high (above-median) or low (below-median) financial development. DCPS is 
credit provided to the private sector in the country (as a % of GDP), and MCAP is market capitalization of listed firms in the 
country (as a % of GDP). The t-statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered at the firm level. INVESTABLE is a 
dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is designated as investable. The dependent variables are 
Excess SG and Excess SFG. Excess SG is a firm’s actual sales or asset growth rate (as indicated) which exceeds its predicted 
sustainable growth rate (SG). The predicted sustainable growth rate (SG) is calculated as (ROE/(1 ROE))where ROE is the 
return on equity. Excess SFG is a firm’s actual sales or asset growth rate (as indicated) which exceeds its predicted short-term 
financed growth rate (SFG). For each firm, SFG is calculated as (ROLTC/(1 ROLTC)) where ROLTC is the ratio of earnings 
after interest and tax to long-term capital. Long-term capital denotes the assets of a firm not financed by short-term debt, and is 
calculated as the product of a firm’s total assets and 1 minus the ratio of short-term liabilities to total assets. A full set of firm-
level control variables, firm and time fixed-effects are included but not reported. # Obs is the number of firm-year 
observations. The overall R-Squared is reported. Statistical significance is denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5 and 10% levels, 
respectively.       
 Measures of Externally Financed Growth (EFG)  
 Excess SG Excess SFG 
 Sales Growth Asset Growth Sales Growth  Asset Growth 
 Domestic Creditor to Private Sector (DCPS) 
 High 
DCPS 
Low 
DCPS 
High 
DCPS 
Low 
DCPS 
High 
DCPS 
Low 
DCPS 
High 
DCPS 
Low 
DCPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
INVESTABLE 
 
-0.063*** 
(3.06) 
-0.027 
(0.98) 
-0.048*** 
(2.79) 
-0.043* 
(1.79) 
-0.068*** 
(3.47) 
-0.010 
(0.34) 
-0.053*** 
(3.12) 
-0.031 
(1.45) 
         
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Obs 7,659 4,564 7,659 4,564 7,659 4,564 7,659 4,564 
R-Squared 0.051 0.031 0.055 0.047 0.045 0.017 0.053 0.029 
 Measures of Externally Financed Growth (EFG) 
 Excess SG Excess SFG 
 Sales Growth Asset Growth Sales Growth  Asset Growth 
 Market Capitalization (MCAP) 
 High 
MCAP 
Low 
MCAP 
High 
MCAP 
Low 
MCAP 
High 
MCAP 
Low 
MCAP 
High 
MCAP 
Low 
MCAP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
INVESTABLE 
 
-0.065*** 
(3.28) 
-0.042 
(1.41) 
-0.062*** 
(3.77) 
-0.037 
(1.38) 
-0.068*** 
(3.89) 
-0.024 
(0.85) 
-0.069*** 
(4.46) 
-0.015 
(0.61) 
         
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Obs 8,496 4,428 8,496 4,428 8,496 4,428 8,496 4,428 
R-Squared 0.042 0.024 0.049 0.044 0.025 0.027 0.025 0.053 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[19] 
 
TABLE 4 
Regression Estimates 
This table reports coefficient estimates from firm-fixed effects with t-statistics (absolute value) reported in parentheses. Seperate 
regressions are reported for single and dual class firms, and for firms with high (above-median) and low (below-median) 
dividend payout. Dividend payout is measured as dividends to assets. The t-statistics are calculated using standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. INVESTABLE is a dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is designated as 
investable. The dependent variables are Excess SG and Excess SFG. Excess SG is a firm’s actual sales or asset growth rate (as 
indicated) which exceeds its predicted sustainable growth rate (SG). The predicted sustainable growth rate (SG) is calculated as 
(ROE/(1 ROE))where ROE is the return on equity. Excess SFG is a firm’s actual sales or asset growth rate (as indicated) 
which exceeds its predicted short-term financed growth rate (SFG). For each firm, SFG is calculated as 
(ROLTC/(1 ROLTC)) where ROLTC is the ratio of earnings after interest and tax to long-term capital. Long-term capital 
denotes the assets of a firm not financed by short-term debt, and is calculated as the product of a firm’s total assets and 1 minus 
the ratio of short-term liabilities to total assets. A full set of firm-level control variables, firm and time fixed-effects are included 
but not reported. # Obs is the number of firm-year observations. The overall R-Squared is reported. Statistical significance is 
denoted by ***, **, * for the 1%, 5 and 10% levels, respectively.       
 Measures of Externally Financed Growth (EFG) 
 Excess SG Excess SFG 
 Sales Growth Asset Growth Sales Growth  Asset Growth 
 Single & Dual-Class Share Firms 
 Single 
Class 
Dual Class Single 
Class 
Dual Class Single 
Class 
Dual Class Single 
Class 
Dual Class 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
INVESTABLE 
 
-0.045** 
(2.50) 
-0.066** 
(2.03) 
-0.057*** 
(3.74) 
-0.050* 
(1.78) 
-0.042*** 
(2.58) 
-0.060** 
(2.01) 
-0.058*** 
(3.98) 
-0.037 
(1.45) 
         
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Obs 9,604 4,217 9,604 4,217 9,604 4,217 9,604 4,217 
R-Squared 0.039 0.027 0.059 0.038 0.025 0.031 0.034 0.042 
 Measures of Externally Financed Growth (EFG) 
 Excess SG Excess SFG 
 Sales Growth Asset Growth Sales Growth  Asset Growth 
 Dividend Payout 
 High DP Low DP High DP Low DP High DP Low DP High DP Low DP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
INVESTABLE 
 
-0.031 
(1.43) 
-0.060*** 
(2.60) 
-0.021 
(1.13) 
-0.079*** 
(3.99) 
-0.045** 
(2.21) 
-0.047** 
(2.28) 
-0.034* 
(1.94) 
-0.069*** 
(3.69) 
         
Firm Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
# Obs 6,909 6,912 6,909 6,912 6,909 6,912 6,909 6,912 
R-Squared 0.033 0.014 0.045 0.019 0.027 0.020 0.033 0.028 
 
